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REFOULEMENT AS PANDEMIC POLICY
Haiyun Damon-Feng*
Abstract: COVID-19 restrictions on access to asylum likely violate nonrefoulement obligations under international and federal law, and while they are
extreme, they are not unique. There is a small but growing body of scholarly
literature that rightly argues that such policies are pretextual covers used to enact
restrictive immigration policy goals, but these arguments generally arise from an
ahistorical perspective. This article positions restrictive COVID immigration
policies in a broader historical context and argues that the United States has a long
history of weaponizing fear of disease and contagion from migrants to justify
restrictive immigration policies. The article offers a historical view both to
demonstrate and question this long pattern of dangerous, xenophobic behavior, and
to caution against using such blunt and sweeping policies in the future. Part I
describes various COVID-19 border closure policies and the ongoing public health
and refugee policy discussions surrounding such policies, with a particular focus
on United States law. Part II then provides an account of international and United
States non-refoulement obligations. Part III situates the current policies within a
broader historical framework, providing examples of earlier proposed and enacted
immigration policies that sought to restrict migration into the United States on
public health grounds.
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INTRODUCTION
The global COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant tensions between
protectionist and nationalist policies predicated on preserving the health and
safety of a nation’s citizens, on the one hand, and domestic and international
law obligations undertaken by a nation to receive asylum seekers and
refugees, on the other. During the COVID-19 pandemic, over ninety-one
percent of the world’s population lived in a country with some sort of COVIDrelated travel restriction, including border closures that functionally blocked
people fleeing persecution from entering a country in order to seek asylum.
At the same time, COVID-19 served as a “threat multiplier” to asylum
seekers, compounding the effects of poverty, lack of healthcare, and violence,
and resulting in an increase in the number of the world’s refugees and asylum
seekers. This led to a significant asymmetry in the need for, and accessibility
of, asylum. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated
that about 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers were unable to pursue
international protection because they were stranded by COVID-related border
closures in 2020. In March of 2020, the United States effectively closed its
borders to asylum seekers through a controversial policy known as “Title 42.”
Immigrant rights advocates and scholars decried these border closures
as violative of the non-refoulement principle of international law, which
prohibits the expulsion or return of individuals to a territory where their life
or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. There is a small
but growing body of scholarly literature that rightly argues that such policies
are pretextual covers for enacting restrictive immigration policy goals, but
these arguments generally arise from an ahistorical perspective. This article
expands upon that literature and argues that while COVID-19 restrictions
impacting access to asylum are extreme, they are not uniquely reactionary to
the COVID-19 pandemic. This article positions these COVID policies in a
broader historical context and argues that the United States has a long history
of weaponizing fear of disease and contagion from migrants to justify
restrictive immigration policies. It offers this historical view to illuminate a
long pattern of dangerous, xenophobic behavior resulting in harsh and often
inhumane treatment of migrants, and to caution against using such blunt and
sweeping policies in the future.
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Part I describes various COVID-19 border closure policies and the
ongoing public health and refugee policy discussions surrounding such
policies, with a particular focus on United States law. Part II then provides an
account of international and United States non-refoulement obligations. Part
III situates the current policies within a broader historical framework,
providing examples of earlier proposed and enacted immigration policies that
sought to restrict migration into the United States on public health grounds.
I.

A GLOBAL PANDEMIC MEETS A GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS

Border closure policies during the pandemic have severely restricted
access to asylum, resulting in widespread humanitarian abuses. A year and a
half into a near-total shutdown of the United States border to asylum seekers,
United States Border Patrol agents were recorded riding on horseback,
swinging whips in the faces of Haitian refugees, and beating them back across
the border into Mexico from Del Rio, Texas.1 The refugees were fleeing
political instability and forced displacement—in July of 2021, Haitian
President Jovenel Moise was assassinated,2 and a month later, a devastating
earthquake killed thousands of people and destroyed 53,000 homes.3 Upon
arriving in the United States, instead of being granted temporary refuge, the
asylum seekers were forced to live in encampments along the United StatesMexico border, waiting and hoping for an opportunity to make their case for
asylum—an opportunity that would never come.4 Many of them were expelled
from the United States en masse before they were ever able to ask for asylum,
and thousands more were left in limbo in Mexico.5
1
Emily Green, US Border Agents Are Removing Haitian Migrants Using Horses and Whips, VICE
(Sept. 20, 2021, 9:22 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/k78vdm/us-border-agents-are-removinghaitian-migrants-using-horses-and-whips; Philip Bump, What one photo from the border tells us about the
evolving migrant crisis, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/09/2
0/what-one-photo-border-tells-us-about-evolving-migrant-crisis/.
2
See Anthony Esposito, Haiti since the assassination of President Moise, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2021,
10:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-one-month-without-assassinated-presidentjovenel-moise-2021-08-06/; Lauren Said-Moorhouse et al., Haiti’s president assassinated, CNN (July 7,
2021, 10:09 PM), https://www.cnn.com/americas/live-news/haiti-president-assassinated-updates-intl/index.
html.
3
John Bacon, Haiti earthquake death toll rises to 2,200, more than 300 people still missing, USA
TODAY (Aug. 22, 2021, 12:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/08/22/haiti-earth
quake-2021-death-toll-rises-over-2-200/8235246002/.
4
See Juan A. Lozano et al., US officials defend expulsion of Haitians from Texas town, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 20, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/health-mexico-texas-caribbean-immigration-56f1f00930
39e2a43e128b7ef0015485.
5
See id.; see also U.S. starts mass expulsion of Haitian migrants from Texas border town, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 20, 2021, 7:15 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/haitian-texas-migrants-mass-expulsion-del-riotexas/.
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During this humanitarian crisis, Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas issued a warning to Haitians: “If you
come to the United States illegally, you will be returned. Your journey will
not succeed, and you will be endangering your life and your family’s life.”6
Further defending the country’s treatment of Haitians and other asylum
seekers entering through the southern border, Mayorkas said, “illegal entry in
between ports of entry in a time of pandemic when we have been quite clear,
explicit, for months now that this is not the way to reach the United States.
And it will not succeed.”7
Secretary Mayorkas’ comments ignore a fundamental tenet of domestic
and international law: seeking asylum is legal, no matter how or where you
enter. The right to do so is enshrined in United States domestic law, and the
United States’ duty to receive asylum seekers is enshrined in its international
treaty obligations. Nevertheless, the United States has used the COVID-19
pandemic to transform the act of seeking asylum into an illicit and
impermissible one. This article will show that this is not the first time the
United States has castigated migrants as vectors of disease transmission in
order to control and restrict migration.
A.

COVID, Border Closures, and Impact on Asylum Seekers

On December 31, 2019, China reported the first cases of what would
soon be recognized as the novel coronavirus COVID-19.8 On January 21,
2020, the United States Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) confirmed the
first United States COVID case, which originated from a person who had
traveled to Washington state from Wuhan, China.9 In early February, the
United States and other countries formally imposed global air travel and
quarantine restrictions.10 On March 11, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) officially declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic, and by midMarch 2020, U.S. states and localities began widely issuing stay-at-home
6

Lozano et al., supra note 4.
CNN Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Sept. 19, 2021) (quoting guest Alejandro Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security).
8
Archived: WHO Timeline—COVID 19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 26, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19.
9
Press Release, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, First Travel-related Case of 2019 Novel
Coronavirus Detected in United States (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html.
10
AMJC Staff, A Timeline of Covid-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020; Kathy Katella, Our Pandemic
Year—A COVID-19 Timeline, YALE MED. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covidtimeline.
7
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orders to slow the spread of the disease.11 Across the globe, nations closed
their borders to human migration and movement. A Pew Research Report
found that, by April of 2020, 91% of the world’s population was living in a
country with some sort of COVID travel restriction.12 Canada closed its
borders to foreign tourism.13 The European Union restricted incoming nonessential travel14 and many member states banned entry from countries with
high rates of COVID infection, such as India.15 The United States banned
entry for non-essential travelers from the European Union and the United
Kingdom.16
The most devastating consequences of border closures, though, have
been for asylum seekers and refugees. At the height of the pandemic, at least
168 nations had closed or restricted their borders and around 90 countries had
closed their borders to those seeking asylum.17 Simultaneously, COVID-19
served as a “threat multiplier,” compounding the effects of poverty, lack of
healthcare, and violence affecting refugees and displaced people.18 There
were 82.4 million forcibly displaced people in the world at the end of 2020,
11

Id.; see also Cal. Exec. Order N-33-20, https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/
3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf; Wash. Proclamation No. 20–25 (Mar.
23, 2020) https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/2025%20Coronovirus%20Stay%2
0Safe-Stay%20Healthy%20%28tmp%29%20%28002%29.pdf; N.Y. State, Governor Cuomo Issues
Guidance on Essential Services Under the ‘New York State on PAUSE’ Executive Order (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-issues-guidance-essential-services-under-new-yorkstate-pause-executive-order.
12
Phillip Connor, More than nine-in-ten people worldwide live in countries with travel restrictions
amid COVID-19, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/01/morethan-nine-in-ten-people-worldwide-live-in-countries-with-travel-restrictions-amid-covid-19/.
At
least
ninety-one percent of the world’s population, or 7.1 billion people, lives in countries with restrictions on
people arriving from other countries who are neither citizens nor residents, such as tourists, business travelers
and new immigrants. Roughly three billion people, or thirty-nine percent, live in countries with borders
completely closed to noncitizens and nonresidents, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of border
closure announcements and United Nations population data.
13
Press Release, Can. Bd. Servs. Agency, COVID-19: Current border measures and requirements,
https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/services/covid/menu-eng.html (last modified Nov. 29, 2021).
14
Council Recommendation on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the
possible lifting of such restriction, 2020 O.J. (L 208/I) 1.
15
Majority of EU Countries Refuse to Lift Entry Ban for Indian Travelers, SCHENGENVISAINFO NEWS,
https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/majority-of-eu-countries-refuse-to-lift-entry-ban-for-indiantravellers/.
16
Megan Specia, What You Need to Know About Trump’s European Travel Ban, NY TIMES (Mar. 14,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/europe/trump-travel-ban-coronavirus.html.
17
Press Release, U.N. Refugee Agency, UNHCR’s Gillian Triggs warns COVID-19 severely testing
refugee protection (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/10/5f7de2724/unhcrsgillian-triggs-warns-covid-19-severely-testing-refugee-protection.html.
18
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR’S GLOBAL COVID-19 NEEDS (2021),
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20COVID-19%20appeal%202%20pager%20-%
2017%20February%202021.pdf; see INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, VIRUS-PROOF VIOLENCE: CRIME AND
COVID-19 IN MEXICO AND THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE (2020), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-americacaribbean/83-virus-proof-violence-crime-and-covid-19-mexico-and-northern-triangle.
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the highest number ever recorded,19 but fewer refugees were resettled in 2020
than any year in the previous two decades.20 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) estimated that about 1.5 million
refugees and asylum seekers were unable to seek international protection
because they were stranded by these border closures in 2020.21
Border closures are particularly harmful to asylum seekers, who rely on
the ability to cross borders to seek safety and refuge.22 Asylum seekers, by
definition, have been displaced from their homes, and they rely on access to
territory outside of their country of origin to seek protection from persecution.
United States law explicitly recognizes this and permits people to seek asylum
regardless of how or where they enter—even if that entry is without
authorization and between ports of entry.23 However, policy changes during
COVID have all but eliminated that ability, leaving countless asylum seekers
in dangerous and inhumane conditions that likely violate United States and
international law.24
B.

Asylum Seekers Expelled Under Title 42

On March 20, 2020, the United States announced that, pursuant to a
controversial and unprecedented exercise of the CDC’s emergency powers, it
would limit all non-essential travel across its land borders.25 There are two
critical points to note with respect to the CDC order, often referred to as “Title
19

U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN FORCED DISPLACEMENT—2020 6 (2021),
https://www.unhcr.org/60b638e37/unhcr-global-trends-2020 [hereinafter Forced Displacement Trends].
Joanna Kakissis & Abu Bakr Bashir, Asylum-Seekers Make Harrowing Journeys in
Pandemic, Only to Be Turned Back, NPR (Feb. 13, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/13/9491
82773/the-harrowing-journeys-to-safety-of-asylum-seekers-during-a-pandemic.
20
Janice Dickson, Refugees turned away in record numbers as countries close borders due to COVID19, GLOBE MAIL (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-refugees-turned-awayin-record-numbers-as-countries-close-borders-due/.
21
Forced Displacement Trends, supra note 19, at 5.
22
Id. at 6 (“Measures implemented by governments to limit the spread of COVID-19, including
restricting freedom of movement and closing borders, made it considerably harder for people fleeing war and
persecution to reach safety.”).
23
8 U.S.C. § 1158.
24
Jaya Ramji-Nogales and Iris Goldner Lang, Freedom of Movement, Migration, and Borders, 19 J.
HUM. RTS. 593 (2020); MIXED MIGRATION CENTER, THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON REFUGEES AND
MIGRANTS ON THE MOVE IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA 12–14 (2021).
25
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ORDER SUSPENDING INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN
PERSONS FROM COUNTRIES WHERE A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/order-suspending-introduction-certain-persons.html (last updated Oct. 13, 2020); Lucas Guttentag,
Coronavirus Border Expulsions: CDC’s Assault on Asylum Seekers and Unaccompanied Minors, STAN. L.
SCH. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2020), https://law.stanford.edu/2020/04/15/coronavirus-border-expulsions-cdcsassault-on-asylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-minors/. Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign
Quarantine: Suspension of Introduction of Persons into United States from Designated Foreign Countries or
Places for Public Health Purposes, 85 Fed. Reg. 16559 (Mar. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 71).
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42” because it is premised on the CDC’s authority under Title 42 of the United
States Code. First, there is no exception for asylum seekers—in fact, Title 42
has been primarily applied to restrict asylum and summarily expel asylum
seekers from the United States without the procedural and substantive
protections that would ordinarily apply.26 Second, the CDC opted to ban only
non-essential travel by certain noncitizens—specifically, asylum seekers and
those arriving without prior authorization—arriving through a land or coastal
border. The CDC did not issue a blanket ban on non-essential travel,
suggesting that the concern was not one of non-essential travel generally, but
of who was coming, how they were arriving, and from where they were
arriving. Title 42 has had a devastating effect on asylum seekers and has
severely limited the ability for migrants, particularly those from Mexico,
Central and South America, and the Caribbean, from accessing asylum in the
United States27 These border closures were made indefinite in May 2020, and
despite federal court orders questioning the legality of Title 42 as applied to
certain groups, the policy continues today.28 To date, it has resulted in over
one million expulsions of individuals from United States territory.29
News reports indicate that the CDC issued its Title 42 order only under
pressure from the White House and then-Vice President Michael Pence, and
that the public health justification mandating Title 42 expulsions was
pretextual.30 According to news reports, Stephen Miller, President Donald
Trump’s senior advisor and the architect of many restrictive Trump-era
26

Denise Gilman, Barricading the Border: COVID-19 and the Exclusion of Asylum Seekers at the
U.S. Southern Border, FRONTIERS HUM. DYNAMICS (Dec. 12, 2020).
27
Id.; see Ashley Binetti Armstrong, Co-Opting Coronavirus, Assailing Asylum, 35 GEORGETOWN
IMMIGR. L.J. 361 (2021).
28
Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries Where a Communicable Disease
Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 31503 (May 26, 2020). Federal courts have questioned the application of Title 42 to
unaccompanied children and families. In P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
preliminarily enjoyed the application of Title 42 to unaccompanied children. P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp.
3d 492 (D.D.C. 2020). That injunction was stayed pending appeal before the D.C. Circuit, but the Biden
administration has confirmed that it will not apply Title 42 to unaccompanied children. Notice of Temporary
Exception From Expulsion of Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children Pending Forthcoming Public Health
Determination, 86 Fed. Reg. 30 (Feb. 17, 2021). In Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia preliminarily enjoined the application of Title 42 to families. Huisha-Huisha v.
Mayorkas, No. 1:21-CV-1000-EGS, 2021 WL 4206688 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2021). That injunction was stayed
by the D.C. Circuit pending appeal, and the Biden administration has continued to apply Title 42 to expel
families. What is Title 42 and How Does It Impact Children and Families?, YOUNG CENTER FOR IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN’S RTS. (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.theyoungcenter.org/stories/2021/10/12/what-is-title-42-andhow-does-it-impact-children-and-families. Oral arguments were held on January 19, 2022, and as of the date
of this writing, that case remains pending before the Court of Appeals.
29
See Haiyun Damon-Feng, Asylum, Interrupted, HARV. L. & POL. REV. BLOG, n.34 (2021),
https://harvardlpr.com/2021/09/16/asylum-interrupted/.
30
Jason Dearen & Garance Burke, Pence Orders Borders Closed after CDC Experts Refused,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 3, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-pandemics-public-health-newyork-health-4ef0c6c5263815a26f8aa17f6ea490ae.
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immigration policies, pushed for the order despite initial resistance from the
Trump administration’s Coronavirus Task Force. The CDC likewise resisted
the idea. and in early March 2020, Dr. Martin Cetron, head of the CDC’s
Division of Migration and Quarantine, “refused to support [Title 42] because
there was not a strong public health basis for such a drastic move.”31 However,
the White House—specifically Vice President Pence—and DHS continued to
pressure the CDC to issue the order, and the CDC eventually relented. One
former health official involved in the process said, “[t]hey forced us. It is
either do it or get fired.”32
Legal scholars and advocates have also argued that Title 42 was largely
pretextual,33 and public health experts have questioned the policy’s
relationship to, and efficacy in, stopping the spread of COVID-19 in the
United States34 Other policies, such as the ongoing detention of noncitizens in
crowded and unhygienic immigration processing and detention facilities, may
contribute more to COVID-19 spread than the mere entry of people through
United States land borders.35 Further, CBP has, in many cases, mandated
COVID-19 tests for people granted humanitarian parole. Public health experts
have suggested that limiting detention and using vaccination programs,
testing, social distancing and outdoor processing, masking, and other
measures to limit the spread among asylum seekers would be more effective
at mitigating the risk of COVID-19 and would not impose undue humanitarian

31

Id.
Id.
33
See generally Gilman, supra note 26; Armstrong, supra note 27.
34
Public Health Experts Issue Recommendations to Protect Public Health and Lives of Asylum
Seekers, COLUM. MAILMAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu
/public-health-now/news/public-health-experts-issue-recommendations-protect-public-health-and-livesasylum-seekers; Public Health Recommendations for Processing Families, Children and Adults Seeking
Asylum or Other Protection at the Border, COLUM. MAILMAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Dec. 2020),
https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/research/program-forced-migration-and-health/public-healthrecommendations-processing-families-children-and-adults-seeking-asylum-or-other; Title 42 Border
Expulsions: How Biden and the CDC’s Misuse of Public Health Authority Expels Asylum Seekers to Danger,
PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS. (May 20, 2021), https://phr.org/our-work/resources/title-42-border-expulsionshow-biden-and-the-cdcs-misuse-of-public-health-authority-expels-asylum-seekers-to-danger/; Public health
experts push CDC to end Title 42 for migrants, asylum-seekers, THE WORLD (Mar. 25, 2021)
https://www.pri.org/file/2021-03-25/public-health-experts-push-cdc-end-title-42-migrants-asylum-seekers;
Rachel M. Pearson, Alejandro Moreno & Ruth Berggren, No Sound Public Health Justification For Biden’s
Migrant Expulsions, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July 12, 2021) https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2021
0712.68756/full/
35
Declaration of 32 Medical & Public Health Experts at ¶¶ 8–28, Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, No.
1:21-CV-00100-EGS (D.C. Cir., Aug. 11, 2021), ECF No. 118-9.
32
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hardship.36 However, the federal government has nevertheless insisted on the
continued application—and expansion—of Title 42.37
The impact of Title 42 has been devastating. Migrants have been
exploited, kidnapped, raped, assaulted, and killed.38 From January to August
2021, there were more than 6,300 reported kidnappings and other violent
attacks against asylum seekers subject to Title 42 expulsions.39 In Mexico, the
attacks on migrants are often brutal and carried out with impunity.40 Litigation
documents reveal that one Salvadoran woman expelled to Mexico under Title
42 was “then kidnapped, raped, and dumped in the desert, before Mexican
police told her that ‘migrants like to be raped’ when she tried to report it; she
then discovered she was pregnant from the rape and suffered a forced abortion
while seeking prenatal care at a public hospital.”41 Kidnappers in Mexico
target migrants, particularly Black migrants, because they are easily
identifiable.42
The violence toward migrants has been exacerbated by the United
States’ execution of Title 42 expulsions. Sometimes, migrants are flown from
one border sector to another, where they are unfamiliar with the territory and
have no resources—leaving them particularly vulnerable to kidnapping and
exploitation—before being expelled.43 Through my work directing the
Adelante Pro Bono Project, which provides rapid response humanitarian legal
services to vulnerable asylum seekers at the border, I have represented
numerous clients who were immediately kidnapped after being expelled to
Mexico. One Salvadoran mother was kidnapped within minutes of being
expelled to Mexico and was held captive for weeks, during which time the
mother was brutally and repeatedly gang raped. When she was eventually
released, she was bound up and left for dead in the desert. A Nicaraguan
36

Id. ¶¶ 13–28.
Id.; see also Notice of Appeal at 54, Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, No. 1:21-CV-00100-EGS (D.C.
Cir., Jan. 12, 2021). On January 31, 2022, news broke that the government had expanded Title 42 to include
the transport of Venezuelan nationals to Colombia after the government was unable to return Venezuelans to
their home country. Priscilla Alvarez, U.S. Begins Quietly Flying Venezuelan Migrants to
Colombia Under Controversial Border Policy, CNN (Jan. 31, 2022), åhttps://www.cnn.com/2022/01/31/
politics/border-venezuela-colombia/index.html.
38
Adam Isacson, Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: Title 42’s Gradual Loosening, WASH. OFF. ON
LATIN AM. (May 21, 2021), https://www.wola.org/2021/05/title-42-weekly-border-update-isacson-updateborder-mexico-us/.
39
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mother was kidnapped with her young child hours after being expelled to
Mexico. When her family was unable to pay the full ransom demanded by the
kidnappers, her child—just ten years old—was released by himself and was
eventually found by a Border Patrol agent, wandering the desert, alone.44
The United States has also begun expelling people under Title 42,
directly or indirectly, to the countries from which they are fleeing. Groups of
Central American asylum seekers have been expelled to southern Mexico and
then forced by Mexican authorities to cross the border into Guatemala.45
Others, including Haitian asylum seekers, have been flown from the United
States directly back to their country of origin.46 Filippo Grandi, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has denounced this practice—
along with mass and summary expulsions under Title 42 generally—as
“inconsistent with international norms” and has suggested that such practices
“may constitute refoulement.”47
II.

NON-REFOULEMENT
PRACTICE

IN

THEORY,

REFOULEMENT

IN

In recognition of the worldwide need to offer humanitarian protection
to those fleeing persecution, 149 nations, including the United States, have
undertaken non-refoulement obligations, prohibiting the forced return of
individuals to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened.48
The United States has also codified non-refoulement obligations under
domestic law, but subsequent Executive Orders and the United States
Supreme Court have narrowed the scope of the obligation. This section traces
through the history and origination of the international non-refoulement
obligation and the ways in which the United States’ interpretation of the
obligation has developed and departed from international law principles.
44

Kevin Sieff & Ismael López Ocampo, Migrant boy found wandering alone in Texas had been
deported and kidnapped, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/09/
migrant-boy-found-wandering-alone-texas-had-been-deported-kidnapped/.
45
See HUM. RTS. FIRST, supra note 39.
46
Id.
47
Press Release, News Comment by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi on
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Non-refoulement Obligations under International Law

Non-refoulement is an international law principle that prohibits the
refoulement, or the expulsion or return, of individuals to a territory where their
life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.49
The principle of non-refoulement is enshrined in Article 33 of the United
Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and was discussed at length during the
Convention’s negotiations.50 Following the atrocities of World War II and the
global refugee crisis that ensued, the newly formed United Nations convened
a Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons.51 A question of critical importance was how the United Nations and
global community could affirm and uphold the “principle that human beings
shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.”52
Member nations recognized “the social and humanitarian nature of the
problem of refugees” and, after much deliberation, entered into the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the “1951 Convention”).53
The non-refoulement provision in the 1951 Convention, as drafted,
provides a clear and unqualified mandate: “No Contracting State shall expel
or return (‘refoule’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”54 The Drafting Committee and the member states at the Conference
discussed the language of the non-refoulement provision at length. The
Committee underscored that refoulement “would be tantamount to delivery
[of the refugee] into the hands of his persecutors”55 and made clear that the
prohibition applied “not only to the country of origin but also to other

49

1951 Refugee Convention art. 33; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
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subjected to torture.” Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture],
implemented by Congress as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998.
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The History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-ofthe-un (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
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countries where the life or freedom of the refugee would be threatened for the
reasons mentioned.56
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention is clear that admission to the country
where the refugee sought protection is not required to avoid being returned.
The term “refouler” was added to the final text of the 1951 Convention to
clarify that physical presence, not admission, in a territory is what triggers the
obligation not to expel or return to a country where the refugee would be
threatened or persecuted.57 The Drafting Committee and member nations
discussed and rejected any language limiting the protection to refugees
already “residing” in the country.58 However, it does appear the Drafting
Committee agreed that Article 33 was not meant to be interpreted as
mandating “any legal obligation in respect of large groups of refugees seeking
access to [a nation’s] territory.”59 While the text makes clear that the nonrefoulement obligation does not apply to people not yet inside a nation’s
territory or borders, that seems to be the textual boundary. Insofar as a limit
on the non-refoulement obligation exists, it appears to start and stop at the
territorial border.60
Member nations also discussed and proposed amendments to Article
33, relating to national security or public safety concerns regarding the
ongoing presence of the refugee. The Drafting Committee and member
nations eventually adopted language related to this exclusion.61 During the
discussion, the French representative noted that a State did not have the right
“to return a refugee without a visa to another country than to his country of
origin or of his lawful permanent residence” and noted that such practice “did
happen, but the practice was illegal.”62 Further, the derogation clause of
Article 9 of the 1951 Convention, which contemplates the balancing between
refugee rights and State sovereignty, allows member states to suspend certain
56

Id.
Id.
58
Id.
59
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was no objection to this interpretation, and the President ruled that such interpretation be placed on record.
60
See, e.g., the Supreme Court’s interpretation of non-refoulement obligations in Sale v. Haitian Ctr.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158–59, 179–88 (1993).
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Weis, supra note 50, at 235; see, e.g., Swedish Amendment. The 1951 Refugee Convention states,
“The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”
1951 Refugee Convention, art. 33(2).
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obligations in times of emergency such as “war or other grave and exceptional
circumstances” if such provision measures are “essential to the national
security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the
Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee.”63 However, the
language “in the case of a particular person” as well as the Commentary
accompanying the provision make clear that this provision is meant to be
applied to individual cases and “may not be taken against all or certain
categories of refugees.”64 States were not permitted to register any
reservations as to Article 33.65
It follows that the operation of Title 42—restricting access to asylum
and exercising refoulement of all refugees seeking protection in the United
States, including those who have entered and were once present in United
States territory—is inconsistent with a textual reading of the 1951
Convention, as well as with the history and spirit of the non-refoulement
protection.66 Human rights non-governmental organizations and scholars
agree that Title 42 violates the non-refoulement obligation of Article 33 of the
Convention.67
B.

Non-refoulement Obligation under United States Law

The United States undertook the obligations in the 1951 Convention
through its accession to the 1967 Protocol. In debating whether the United
States was going to sign onto the 1967 Protocol, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations discussed the obligations imposed by Article 33. At the
time, the United States understood the obligation as broadly “prohibit[ing] the
expulsion or return of refugees to territories where their life or freedom would
be threatened.”68 In his testimony to the Committee, Laurence Dawson,
Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs within
the Department of State, noted that both “President [Johnson] and Secretary
[of State Dean] Rusk have pointed out that the prohibition against the return
of refugees to countries where they would face persecution is of foremost

63
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importance among the Protocol’s provisions.”69 There was no Senate
opposition to the Protocol, and it was ratified by the United States in 1968.70
The United States later codified the obligation of non-refoulement
under domestic law with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (the
“Refugee Act”).71 Before 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
Section 243(h) permitted, but did not require, the Attorney General to
withhold deportation of individuals who would likely be persecuted if
deported.72 The Refugee Act converted this discretionary ability into a nondiscretionary mandate. Now, under INA Section 241(b)(3),73 the Attorney
General “may not remove an [individual] to a country if the Attorney General
decides that the [individual’s] life or freedom would be threatened in that
country because of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”74 The only exceptions to the nonrefoulement mandate are for specific, enumerated reasons relating to national
security or public safety, mirroring the structure of Article 33 of the 1951
Convention.75 This provision of the INA is generally referred to as
“withholding of removal.” It is notable that the category of individuals eligible
for protection from withholding of removal is broader than that of individuals
who may be eligible for asylum, again in recognition of the strong
commitment of non-refoulement underlying the statute.76
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United States courts have explicitly acknowledged that the Refugee Act
“mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee
Act of 1980,”77 which suggests that the scope of the non-refoulement
obligation of Article 33 should comport with the obligation adopted under
domestic law. However, despite the strong historical commitment to nonrefoulement, the United States Supreme Court has limited the country’s nonrefoulement obligations to apply only to those already within United States
territorial borders. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the Supreme Court
considered the extent of the United States’ non-refoulement obligations as
applied to the United States’ ongoing policy of Haitian interdiction and held
that non-refoulement obligations do not extend to those who had not yet
reached United States territory.78
At that time, Haiti had been in a state of political turmoil for over twenty
years, and a coup in September 1991 overthrowing Haiti’s first democratically
elected president resulted in a mass Haitian refugee crisis.79 Hundreds of
thousands of Haitians were internally displaced, and tens of thousands fled
the country to seek protection in the United States.80 Ten years before the
coup, in 1981, the Reagan Administration began the Haitian interdiction
program to intercept Haitian refugees on the high seas during their journey to
the United States81 On September 29, 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued
a Proclamation and Executive Order that classified the increased flow of
undocumented Haitian refugees as having “threatened the welfare and safety
of communities” in the United States and authorized the United States Coast
Guard to interdict vessels transporting refugees in order to prevent or suspend
their entry into United States territory.82 Scholars and advocates raised
immediate concerns over the potential human rights and non-refoulement
violations of the interdiction policy,83 and a United States federal court and
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UNHCR disagreed as to whether non-refoulement protects refugees in transit,
who have not yet reached United States territory.84
Following the 1991 coup and subsequent swell of Haitian refugees
fleeing political turmoil, President George H.W. Bush revived the interdiction
policy.85 Initially under this policy, Haitians stopped at sea were quickly
screened for asylum eligibility. Those who were deemed to be “true” asylum
seekers, as opposed to economic migrants, were permitted to enter the United
States, while others were forcibly repatriated to Haiti.86 Between October
1991 and May 1992, the Coast Guard interdicted over 34,000 Haitians.
Because the high volume of refugees could not be safely processed on the
Coast Guard boats, many were sent to facilities on Guantanamo Bay for
processing. Those facilities, which had a capacity of around 12,500 people,
quickly filled up, and refugees continued to come. On May 22, 1992, the
United States Navy determined that it could not safely accommodate
additional people on Guantanamo Bay, and the following day, President Bush
issued an executive order to interdict and repatriate Haitians without being
screened for potential asylum eligibility at all.87
In Executive Order 12807, President Bush stated that the nonrefoulement obligations of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention “do not extend
to persons located outside the territory of the United States,”88 laying the
groundwork for the government’s claim that interdiction without any
screening or possibility of accessing asylum in the United States was not a
violation of international or domestic law prohibiting refoulement. The issue
was litigated up to the Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
which ultimately agreed with the government’s interpretation.
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In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,89 the Supreme Court read a
territorial limitation into the non-refoulement obligation and held that Article
33 and the withholding of removal provision provided in the Refugee Act,
formerly Section 243(h) of the INA, did not guarantee protection to people
who had not yet reached United States territory.90 The Court relied heavily on
the debating history and text of Article 33, which is mirrored, in relevant part,
by the withholding of removal provision of the INA, and its prohibition to
“return” or “expel.”91 The prohibition to return or expel, the Court reasoned,
necessarily requires an individual to be present on United States territory, and
neither Article 33 nor the INA provided protection to people who were
interdicted and repatriated before reaching United States territory.92
The exclusion of asylum seekers not yet on United States soil creates
an odd result when the reason an individual does not reach United States
territory—and therefore is prevented from accessing asylum and humanitarian
protection—is deliberate United States action that blocks them from accessing
the territory. UNHCR has condemned this type of action as violating the
obligation of non-refoulement, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Sale.93
Most recently, in Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California evaluated the question with
respect to a policy of “turnbacks” at the border through a practice of
“metering,” wherein asylum seekers were turned away from or prevented
from accessing United States ports of entry to seek asylum to regulate and
artificially slow the flow of asylum seekers into the United States94 There, the
89
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District Court held that the turnback policy violated the government’s
inspection and referral duties with respect to the asylum provision of the INA.
In so finding, the District Court pointed to the actions United States agents
and officials were taking on United States soil to direct turnbacks of asylum
seekers and interfere with their ability to access United States territory.
Nevertheless, with respect to non-refoulement, the District Court
“regrettably” could not hold that the non-refoulement obligation had
extraterritorial application and cited the Supreme Court’s interpretation in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council as controlling.95
It should be noted, however, that the District Court, in so holding, did
not discuss a key fact that distinguishes Al Otro Lado from Sale—namely,
whether actions to block access to United States territory were taken on United
States soil. The District Court correctly pointed out that Sale permitted the
extraterritorial return of asylum seekers, but certain turnbacks happened after
the individual had arrived on United States soil.96 Expulsion of asylum seekers
when they are within United States territory appears to clearly violate Article
33 and is on the other side of the boundary of non-refoulement—that is,
interdiction and repatriation of asylum seekers before they reach United States
territory —established by Sale. Expulsions under Title 42 similarly occur after
the individual has reached United States soil and therefore likely violate the
non-refoulement obligation.
The precise confines of the non-refoulement obligation remains a
contested issue around the world. UNHCR has been steadfast in its
interpretation that the obligation applies extraterritorially. Similarly, the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights have rejected the idea that the border itself is the boundary
triggering the non-refoulement obligation.97 Nevertheless, nations around the
world continue to try to interdict or halt asylum seekers from reaching their
shores and accessing protection.98
The debate on the scope of the non-refoulement obligation is not new
and hearkens back to the debates surrounding the extent to which signatories
to the 1951 Convention agreed to extend protection—or access to systems
requesting protection—through international human rights accords. Naturally,
sovereigns view their primary obligation as owing to their own citizens—to
95
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guard their own resources and to protect their lands and security, broadly
defined. A natural and unsettling corollary of this principle is that if a
sovereign guards its territory by preventing asylum seekers from accessing
territory, land and sea borders can become an absolute wall blocking refugees
from even seeking protection. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sale
concluded, “This case presents a painfully common situation in which
desperate people, convinced that they can no longer remain in their homeland,
take desperate measures to escape. Although the human crisis is compelling,
there is no solution to be found in a judicial remedy.”99 But these lamentations
ring hollow, particularly when we view these derogations of responsibility to
asylum seekers in the broader historical context of exclusionary immigration
practices, which are often linked to race and “otherness.”
Furthermore, it should be noted that Title 42 applies to people who are
seeking entry at ports of entry as well as people who have entered without
inspection between ports of entry and are on United States soil. Under Title
42, asylum seekers who are apprehended in the United States are nonetheless
expelled out of the country without the opportunity to make any type of claim
for asylum and are at risk of violence and persecution in Mexico. At the very
least, it seems that, for this large group of people, the United States is
expelling them in violation of the non-refoulement obligation.
III.

CASTING BLAME AND CLOSING BORDERS: WEAPONIZING
PUBLIC HEALTH FEARS TO RESTRICT MIGRATION

Politicizing epidemics leads directly to more exclusionary attitudes
toward immigration,100 a phenomenon observed time and again in the United
States and prominently displayed in the COVID context. This section first
documents the politicization of the COVID pandemic in the United States. It
then provides a historical overview of United States responses to other
pandemics and epidemics and the effects the politicization of those episodes
had on immigration policy.
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The Politicization of COVID

President Trump politicized COVID as a way to further his antiimmigrant agenda. On June 20, 2020, before a large, closely packed, indoor,
and unmasked crowd in Tulsa, Oklahoma, then-President Trump held his first
campaign rally since the country was shut down for COVID.101 Trump was
behind in the polls.102 COVID cases in Tulsa County were steadily
increasing.103 Trump told his crowd of supporters that he directed his
administration to deliberately slow down COVID testing in an admitted effort
to artificially deflate the number of confirmed COVID cases because case
numbers were rising too rapidly.104 As the crowd behind him chanted, “USA!
USA! USA!” Trump referred to COVID as the “kung flu,” resulting in
scattered cheers and laughter from the crowd.105 At a rally in Phoenix three
days later, as Trump was gearing up to deliver the racist punchline again, his
supporters beat him to it, shouting “kung flu” as Trump repeated the slur back
to them several times as the crowd cheered him on.106
Trump used anti-Asian rhetoric to refer to COVID throughout the
pandemic. In addition to “kung flu,” Trump also repeatedly referred to
COVID as the “Chinese virus,” casting blame on China and Chinese people
for spreading the disease.107
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Trump’s anti-Asian rhetoric around COVID caused a spike in antiAsian sentiment and anti-Asian hate crime in the United States108
At the same time, Trump was downplaying the seriousness of the
pandemic and sabotaging public health efforts to contain disease spread.
Trump flouted mask mandates109 and refused to abide by social distancing
measures. Instead, Trump hosted “super spreader” events like the Rose
Garden reception for Amy Coney Barrett110 and suggested that “hit[ting] the
body” with a “tremendous” amount of “ultraviolet or just very powerful light”
or injecting oneself with bleach and disinfectant “inside, or almost a
cleaning…because you see it gets in the lungs and it does a tremendous
number on the lungs” might be more effective treatments.111
After Trump contracted COVID, he was hospitalized to receive
experimental treatments and life-saving care.112 As he recovered, Trump
doubled down on messaging that Americans need not worry about the virus,
telling them, “Don’t be afraid of COVID. Don’t let it dominate your life…. I
feel better than I did 20 years ago!”113 When he returned to the White House,
while still visibly struggling with the aftereffects of COVID, he immediately
removed his mask to speak with the press before going inside.114 More than
400,000 Americans died from COVID on Trump’s watch, and the policies
108
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and politics stemming from his politicization of the pandemic continued to
cause the deaths of many more.115
B.

Sanitary Reform and Chinese Exclusion

The United States has a long history of castigating migrant groups for
infectious diseases. An early example is the treatment of Chinese immigrants,
large numbers of which lived on the West Coast during the late 1800s. Chinese
Exclusion and the restrictive policies targeting Chinese immigrants during
that period form the foundations of modern immigration law and policy.116
During this time, Chinese immigrants were beaten, lynched, and massacred
up and down the West Coast. While there is substantial legal scholarship
surrounding the plenary power doctrine that arose out of the Chinese
Exclusion Case, there has been comparatively little written on the public
sentiments, prejudice, and atrocities committed against the Chinese that
undoubtedly influenced the harsh immigration doctrine that followed.
In the late 1800s, and in particular the 1880s, the United States was at
the height of the “sanitary reform” movement, which generally attributed
disease spread and contagion to filth, such as odors from decomposing organic
waste, stagnant and dirty water, and lack of sunlight.117 Public officials sought
to improve sewage systems and waste sanitation,118 and the American public
was similarly concerned with filth as a mode of disease spread.119 At the same
time, the United States had been dealing with pandemic and epidemic disease
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outbreaks throughout the 1800s, including cholera, typhus, typhoid fever,
scarlet fever, and yellow fever.120
These conditions sowed the seeds for what historian Joan Trauner calls
“medical scapegoatism” against Chinese immigrants, who frequently lived in
crowded conditions and were treated with suspicion by public health officials
seeking to rationalize the failure of their sanitary programs in controlling
disease spread.121 Trauner found that whenever there was an epidemic in San
Francisco, “health officials descended upon Chinatown with a vengeance.”122
Several forces drove anti-Chinese sentiment at the time, including
beliefs that the Chinese were unassimilated and unassimilable, barbaric, and
inferior, and the “medical argument, that the Chinese, ignoring all laws of
hygiene and sanitation, bred and disseminated disease, thereby endangering
the welfare of the state and of the nation.”123 These forces produced and stoked
political will in support of anti-Asian exclusionary immigration policies,
including Chinese Exclusion. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first
significant piece of federal legislation restricting immigration into the United
States, and in 1902, Chinese immigration was banned permanently.124 It was
not until forty years later, in 1943, that the Chinese Exclusion Act was finally
repealed.125
C.

Detention, Toxic “Disinfection” and Typhus

Typhus was a disease of worldwide epidemic concern in the nineteenth
century but did not attract much attention in the United States until 1916, when
typhus that had been endemic to certain regions in Mexico was reported in the
United States near the United States-Mexico border.126 Before then, travel
across the border was generally unrestricted, and citizens from either nation
were free to cross.127 In December 1915, three cases of typhus were identified
in El Paso, Texas. United States public health officials blamed the novel cases
120
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on the influx of Mexican laborers and migrants coming into the United States
through the southern border.128 There was an immediate clamp-down on
Mexican migration into the United States, and over the next two years, the
United States government set up “disinfecting plants” along the southern
border at various ports of entry to “de-louse” Mexican nationals entering the
United States129 Upon entering the United States, Mexican nationals were
taken and quarantined at these stations, where they were detained, stripped
naked, inspected, had their heads shaved, and were sprayed down and bathed
with kerosene (gasoline) “soap,” which was extremely toxic.130 According to
the United States Public Health Service, over 12,300 people went through this
process at the El Paso quarantine station in a one-month period from January
2 to February 9, 1917.131 All told, some 870,000 people were inspected, and
nearly 70,000 were disinfected.132
Mexican migration into the United States continued to be inhibited by
these types of practices long after the typhus epidemic subsided. As one
historian noted, “medical inspections remained in force until the late 1930s; a
public health response to a manageable epidemic had metamorphosed into a
protracted quarantine along the entire United States–Mexico border.”133 After
that, for Mexicans entering the United States as part of the Bracero program,
the United States set up a similar system wherein Braceros entering the United
States were funneled through processing stations and sprayed with DDT,
another extremely toxic substance.134
During COVID, noncitizens in immigration custody at various
detention centers across the country were sprayed with toxic disinfectants that
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poisoned their bodies and burned their skin.135 On May 21, 2020, immigrant
rights advocates filed a complaint with the DHS Office of Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties alerting DHS to the use of hazardous chemicals on detainees
in the Adelanto Detention Facility in Southern California.136 Detainees
testified that guards at Adelanto were spraying a chemical called “HDQ
Neutral” constantly throughout the day and night inside the largely
unventilated facility, despite warnings that the chemical causes “[i]rreversible
eye damage and skin burns.” The warnings further advised: “Avoid breathing.
Do not get in eyes or on skin. Wear goggles and face shields.”137 While the
guards were given masks, gloves, and protective gear to shield themselves
from the harmful effects of the spray, the detainees were not. Detainees
reported suffering severe health effects as a result of the spray: burning skin
and rashes, blisters, nose bleeds, burning lungs, nausea, and sneezing and
coughing blood.138 People detained at the Houston Contract Detention Facility
in Texas and the Glades County Detention Center in Florida reported similar
exposure to disinfectants.139 Public health experts agree that spraying noxious
and poisonous disinfectants that cause health issues, including respiratory
issues, was not a safe or appropriate way to prevent COVID in detention
facilities. Rather, what would have been effective to combat COVID was the
release of people from detention and the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and social distancing measures within detention facilities.140
D.

Proposed Border Closures and Swine Flu (H1N1)

A particularly interesting comparator case to COVID is the H1N1
Swine Flu, which was declared to be a global pandemic by the WHO in June
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2009 and was the first global flu in forty years.141 The first case of H1N1 was
detected in California on April 15, 2009.142 By the time the WHO declared it
to be a pandemic, seventy-four countries and territories around the world had
confirmed infections.143 It was later determined that the virus’s presence in
humans originated in Mexico.144 Once again, noncitizens and migrants were
targeted as the cause of the disease.145
Immigrants—especially Mexican immigrants—were particularly
targeted for racist and xenophobic remarks. Conservative talk show host
Michael Savage propagated racist pandemic theories on his talk show. Savage
said, “I’m going to talk about the horrible, horrible story of illegal aliens
bringing a deadly new flu strain into the United States of America. Make no
mistake about it: illegal aliens are the carriers of the [Swine Flu].”146 There
were conspiracy theories that “it would be easy to bring an altered virus into
Mexico, put it in the general population, and have them cross the border.”147
Sean Hannity asked his viewers, “Is this [Swine Flu] the latest border
crisis?”148
Calls to shut down the border between the United States and Mexico
made their way to the Senate floor. In a hearing of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senator John McCain and
others questioned Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and Dr.
Anne Schuchat, Interim Deputy Director for the CDC’s Science and Public
Health Program, on the possibility of closing the United States–Mexico
border.149 The idea was met with resistance, as both Napolitano and Schuchat
explained that shutting down the border would not effectively contain disease
spread.150 Ultimately, the border was not shut down. Instead, vaccines were
141
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developed and made widely available, and on August 11, 2010, the WHO
announced the end of the H1N1 pandemic.151
One notable difference between the H1N1 and COVID pandemics was
the relative severity of the illnesses. COVID has been much more
transmissible and much more severe—and deadly—than H1N1.152 Another
key difference is the way the Obama administration handled the H1N1
pandemic compared with the way the Trump and Biden administrations
handled, and continue to handle, the COVID pandemic. In 2009, the pandemic
generally was not politicized by those in the administration. Instead, the
response typically was to defer to national and international public health
experts and to resist drastic measures like wholesale border closures.
By contrast, with respect to COVID, the pandemic was politicized, with
those in the highest positions of power stoking anti-Asian and anti-immigrant
sentiments. Public health officials were strongarmed into closing the border,
even to asylum seekers. This has caused a worsening humanitarian crisis at
the southern border, placing vulnerable people in unstable, dangerous, and
violent situations, and violating non-refoulement obligations under domestic
and international law.
It has been shown that politicizing epidemics results in anti-immigrant
sentiment, and in the case of COVID, that seems to have been intentional.
Most recently, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued a directive to state police
to pull over civilians transporting recently arrived immigrants and asylum
seekers because of their purported risk of carrying COVID.153 The Department
of Justice brought suit against Abbott and Texas, challenging the directive as
unlawful, and the directive was enjoined by federal court order shortly after it
was issued.154
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CONCLUSION
Title 42 and the United States’ COVID response has been extreme, but
it is not unique. It is the latest in a long line of xenophobic reactions, policies
and laws that blame immigrants for disease spread—resulting in restrictive
and harsh immigration policies. The restrictive policies are generally
overbroad and disproportionately harm immigrants while disconnected from
or not tailored to the public health benefits they were purported to achieve.
With respect to COVID, public health experts have pointed to limiting the use
of detention, social distancing, masking, and COVID testing as ways to
process asylum seekers safely and humanely into the country.155 All of these
tools are within the federal government’s toolbox. What is lacking is the
political will to use them. Recognition of the history of xenophobic treatment
of immigrants in times of epidemic crisis is necessary to understand and
reflect on our collective willingness to tolerate such blunt, harmful, restrictive
policies, and, hopefully, help us find the collective will to check such impulses
now and in the future.
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